

The communist system in China – inspirations from the past

On October 1, 1949, on the Tiananmen place, communist leader Mao Zedong proclaimed establishing the People's Republic of China. That fact was a critical change in the hitherto authority system in the State of the Middle. The victory of communists in the civil war resulted in the necessity of introducing a new social and political order. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that it was formed, to much extent, basing on already-known forms from the past. Many solutions applied in China after 1949 had their prototypes much earlier. In author's opinion, the times of Republic of China and the People's Republic of China did not break this long chain of history. In case of this country, historical continuousness from the most ancient times up till the contemporary ones can be consider. What can be observed, are constant referrals to the antecedents. On the other hand, one should note that in China such referrals have never been articulated directly. The two zones, of what has and what has not been verbally expressed, are of equal importance. Hence, allusions or reticences can often be found in Chinese tradition. François Jullien (2006) drew attention on osmosis of two areas, one of direct expressions and the other, bringing "polemical substrate," i.e. of what is expressed directly and indirectly (Jullien, 2006). As he wrote: "the concept of allusion assumes two aspects: the importance of what has been said in comparison to what has not been said, as well as significance of link between them both" (Jullien, 2006, p. 258). Leonid Vasilyev (1974) drew attention to strong links with tradition, underlining that "an important feature of Chinese system of dogmas, standards and traditions was not only the constant and very significant orientation on the past (that once used to be treated as an unequalled benchmark), but also creating, within ages, such forms of social and political organizations that provided optimal conditions for continuation of that system in an almost unchanged form" (Vasilyev, 1974, p. 443). However, he noticed that Chinese culture together with all ideas and institutions was subjected to a process of changes and development. New solutions were breaking through very slowly, being created in confrontation with traditional models. They rather used to fail than win. But what is important is the fact that by making even a little influence on separate spheres of life, the modern solutions constituted some way of perfecting and evolving traditions themselves. Hence, Vasilyev seems to be very much true when saying that "the dogma triumphed, the supremacy of tradition was total, but both the dogmas and traditions were changing as the time passed by" (Vasilyev, 1974). Joseph Needham (1984) underlined the meaning of precedence and convention in the context of considering Chinese authorities' performances. Thus, one can say that the state has always been ruled by the Confucians party (Needham, 1984).

According to determinants of Confucians ideology, the government in the state of the Middle was a prolongation of the family. Relations, fixed in micro-scale, were naturally translated onto higher levels of social integration. There is a strict correlation between the structure of the family and the structure of the state. A precisely defined range of laws and duties can be found there. Social roles are unambiguously differentiated. Obedience and duty constitute the basic determinants of Confucians thinking. As Confucius (Kongzi, Master Kong, 551–479 BC) used to say: “It is needed for the emperor to behave as the emperor shall, for the minister – as the minister shall, for the father – as the father shall, and for the son – as the son shall” (Confucius, 1976, p. 121). As every member of the family should subject to the will of the father, the senior of the family, thus, all the citizens shall obey the decisions of the highest authorities. In the opinion of Lin Yutang (2003), the Chinese society is organized basing on the family system (Lin Yutang, 2003). In such approach, people constitute the basic goals for which the state exists and performs. Hence, the state can be called a common endeavor, within which all the citizens share the results of their works. The world is perfect, people have to tend to keep it in such balance. All the citizens, properly fulfilling their duties, contribute to harmonic and proper development of the state and the society. People are not equal upon the laws of nature, hence, various links and subsidence relations exist. Each individual, possessing a special role to be performed, fulfills his duty towards the society in which he or she exists. Collectivism significantly dominates over individualism. The society is a sum of individuals, co-operating with each other and contributing to the growth of country’s power. In China, a strong affection to tradition and culture lead to forming a specific scheme of world perception. According to the accepted theory, this was China that constituted the middle of the world. That resulted in a characteristic feeling of supremacy over foreigners. This is not accidental that the own name of the state is *Zhongguo*, meaning the State of the Middle. The mentality of the contemporary Chinamen has not changed very much in this area.

Confucianism, being not a religion but rather an ethic-moral system, has actually taken religion’s place in Chinese conditions. In Gu Hongming’s (2004) opinion, Confucius has transferred the true idea of state to the Chinese people. Hence, the public zone, the widely-considered area of social and political life, were given an almost religious justification. Here, one can conclude that a religion of state or religion of society are present in China (Gu Hongming, 2004).

Besides Confucianism, the philosophy of legists (*fajia*) was also developing in the ancient China. It had its days in the period of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC). The main goal of the legists was to create a strong, centralized state. The necessity of working out proper system of legal regulations was constantly mentioned, providing emperor’s law to make any amendments or corrections into it. The legists suggested implementing a system of awards and punishments. The mechanism based on legists’ ideas lead to growth of spying and society’s invigilation, moreover killing any expressions of individual freedom. Many solutions from that period were later on adapted by communist authorities in Mao’s times. Mao Zedong sometimes identified himself with the establisher of Chinese empire, Qin Shihuangdi (Garnet, 1973).

Within 20th century, referrals to the antecedents took place many times. Norms, previously stated among the society or unwritten traditions, determined, to much extent, performances of state leaders. Simultaneously, these were the rules that decided on legitimization of the highest authorities. Here, it is worth to recall the opinion of Max Weber, who specified three types of authority's legitimization: charismatic (deriving from citizens' conviction on particular predispositions of the ruler, allowing him to be in authority), traditionalistic (deriving from conviction that old institutions are the best ones), and rationalist or legal (basing on conviction that the authority depends on stated legal order, focused on aims accepted by citizens) (Szostak, 1997). On the other hand, David Beetham indicated three areas to consider the concept of state government legitimization. Legitimization of the authority can be considered when it has been obtained and is conducted according to the accepted rules. Besides, rules of the authority need to find justification in convictions of parties linked by ruling relations. An active acceptance of citizens for ruling dependencies is assumed (Beetham, 1995). In the opinion of Władysław Szostak (1997), it is also important within the context of the discussed process to justify the performed rulings, i.e. to provide the basis of its performance (Szostak, 1997). The above described considerations can be easily referred to Chinese reality. In the empire period, the basis of state government legitimization was the Mandate of Heavens (*tianming*). The emperor ruled by the approval of Heavens, performing as an intermediary between the Earth and the cosmic zone. Nevertheless, this mandate was not given forever. An emperor, performing his duties in a wrong way, might have been derived of his authority. Hence, the justification for revolution appears in Chinese tradition. The people were given a strong right to overturn a bad ruler who had started to consider only his own interest, without attention to the common wealth. In China, a particularly important role is connected with unwritten norms, indicating behavior of authorities and common citizens. A characteristic feature of Chinese political system was strong and charismatic leadership. The ruler represented a defined set of features, allowing him to be in authority. For sure, such role was played in the previous century by Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.

In China, after the empire broke down, no new traditions were created without finding justifications or even equivalents in the past. Obviously, it is hard to omit some inspirations from outside. But, however, it should be underlined that the phenomenon of "merging" was rather of selective character, i.e. adopting only some foreign solutions with maintaining domestic traditions. Foreign solutions played rather supporting role in relation to what could have been observed in China for ages.

Only in this context, the appearance of communist party on Chinese political scene should be considered. Since the very beginning, this movement worked out its own path; copying of foreign benchmarks did not take place. Marxist and Leninist rules got "sinized." In China, communist system of clearly national character was developing, taking into account the specific of this huge country. It should be underlined that information possessed by the leaders of the newly-established party about Marxism were very selective. Firstly, anarchism was popular among these societies, particularly works of Piotr A. Kropotkin and Mikhail A. Bakunin. Mao Zedong himself, only in the second decade of 20th century, working in magazines' library in Beijing, met the works of Marx and Lenin. Mao constructed his knowledge about socialism basing on

only three books – *The Communist Manifest*, *History of Socialism* by Kirkup and Kautsky's *The Struggle of Classes* (Terril, 2001). Leszek Kołakowski (2003) in his work *Main streams of Marxism* wrote that Mao “was in that time a nationalist and democrat of unclear socialist tendencies, but not a Marxist” (Kołakowski 2003, p. 581). Hence, it is hard to consider imitating patterns from Moscow or other socialist countries. Obviously, referrals to Bolshevik revolution took place, well presented by works of prof. Li Dazhao (1918), who often referred to this issue and the phenomenon of communism itself in the press. In the article *The Victory of Bolshevism* he underlined that defeating the Germans in the war had been a triumph of humanitarianism and pacifism, righteousness and freedom, democracy and socialism. Simultaneously, it had been a triumph of Bolshevism and the global working class. Li belonged to the group of strongest supporters of idea of transplanting Russian experiences into Chinese ground (Li Dazhao, 1918). The Chinese Communist Party, in the first years of its existence, should be called as a narrow couple of intellectuals; members of this couple were clustered in small discuss groups. On the establishing congress, held on the turn of June and July 1921 in Shanghai, only thirteen Chinese delegates and two representatives of Communist International were present. Communism in China was formed basing on the previous mass protests of the people, New Culture Movement and The May Fourth 1919 Movement, of clearly patriotic character, but simultaneously expressing protest against performances of Beijing authorities, aggressive policy of Japan and other Western powers in the area of the State of the Middle. In the same time, a rapid development of Chinese academic centers took place. Many activists of this time, particularly from the left part of The May Fourth 1919 Movement, joined the communist party later on. That fact made an important influence on the established party, characterized by such elements as strong nationalism, demur against foreigners, frequent referrals to domestic past. Domestic experiences were opposed to the Western culture. In this context, Chinese communists found their own path, different from the vision propagated by the Soviet Union and the Komintern. This derived not only from the feeling of difference, possessing own, different consciousness, but also from the specific character of the state. China is mostly an agricultural country. The Chinese Communist Party was based mostly on peasants. An outstanding American sinologist, John King Fairbank, underlined that “economical base of China was generally an agricultural one, and, hence, the Chinese revolution had to be of much more agricultural character than the Soviet one. The peasants were to be the main revolutionists. The final feature deciding on ‘sinization’ of Marxism was the overwhelming proud of country’s history and culture, meaning that China cannot be ‘a tail of any dog.’ In the effect, the Chinese people were only ready to accept Chinese Marxism” (Fairbank, 1996, p. 299). Workers did not play a bigger role in the Chinese Communist Party. This was undoubtedly a characteristic element in comparison to membership structure of other communist parties in the world, based on proletariat. In 1920s, the Chinese proletariat was only ca. 2 million persons, making only 0.5% of total Chinese population of that time.¹ Additionally, it

¹ J. Chesnaux gives that in 1920, proletariat in China made ca. 1.5 million persons, out of whom 40% worked in foreign-owned companies (Chesnaux, 1969). J. Guillerma, on the other hand, defined the total number of proletarians at the beginning of 1920s at the level of 2 million persons (Guillerma, 1968).

has to be noticed that the masses were very much dispersed, what undoubtedly made a big influence on processes connected with mutual coordination and organization of activities. Hence, these were the peasants who became the main engine of the revolution, although the meaning of worker-peasants' alliance was underlined in official propaganda, paying special respect to the role of the army. These three groups became kinds of party's backbone. It is worth mentioning that for a long time, by the beginning of 1950s, the idea of creating a "common front" of representatives of various classes was propagated.

Communism in China was formed not only in confrontation with the Nationalist Party (Guomindang), but also in struggle against Japanese aggressor. This was the conducted partisan struggle that created rules, directly indicating inspirations from the past. Mao Zedong, defining main military assumptions, recalled Sunzi (1997), the author of *The Art of War*.² The ancient thinker indicated few elements, important from the point of view of military strategy. What becomes important is defining own and enemy's potential. The victory is to be obtained by the smallest possible own losses. Hence, reconnaissance not only among enemy troops, but also in the terrain becomes so important. By obtaining enemy's plans, one can prepare himself properly. From this point of view, the necessity of destroying his alliances has to be considered. Understanding oneself is not less important than recognizing the enemy. The fight is to be taken up only in case of sureness of triumph. In uncertain situation, one should restrain himself, applying defensive. One should fight in conditions providing big chances of winning. Sunzi refused fighting in situation of uncertainty or big hazard. Nevertheless, he suggested applying techniques of manipulation, possessing efficient military intelligence, introducing chaos into enemy's troops. Diversion actions are focused on winning enemy's troops for own ones. Enemy's weaknesses need to be used and the weakest sides – attacked. The attack should be well organized, as time of action plays the most important role to make the victory. Sunzi drew very big attention to actions in hard terrain, and, particularly, to proper recognition (Sunzi, 1997). By recalling Sunzi's works, one can easily note that communist troops conducted this scheme very precisely. Mao Zedong used also many solutions applied in the first half of 19th century by Taiping army. Referring to Sunzi's ideas, struggles with Guomindang and Japan were conducted. Mao understood the necessity of constant military activity, applying the strategy of long-term war (Mao Zedong, 1953). Counterattack could have been taken up only in certain conditions. For these needs, active help of local population for communist troops was necessary, as well as good starting positions, full concentration of own main forces, finding enemy's weak points, his physical and moral tiredness, as well as his wrong moves (Mao Zedong, 1953). Patient waiting for good conditions to attack and taking advantage of all enemy's military mistakes lead to guaranteeing military success. Simultaneously, there was sense in "forcing the enemy to make mistakes," by using what Sunzi called "creating appearances" (Mao Zedong, 1953, p. 296).

² Sunzi lived probably in 6th age BC, in the Springs and Autumns period (772–481 BC). He is identified as the author of *The Art of War* (Sunzi Bingfa), or at least its basic part. Later on, the text was reedited and filled few times. The tractate is assumed as the oldest one in the world, describing precisely the rules of carrying out struggles. In 2nd age BC, a well-known historian Sima Qian wrote the biography of master Sunzi.

Basing on Sunzi's work, eight political and four tactical rules of the Chinese Communist Party were worked out. They regarded the following issues: 1. Hang up all your doors when you leave the house (doors in China were used by soldiers as beds – note Otto Braun); 2. Bind the mats and give them back; 3. Be friendly and kindly towards the citizens and help them if you can; 4. Give back whatever you have borrowed; 5. Repair whatever you have damaged; 6. Be fair by any transactions with peasants; 7. Pay for everything you buy; 8. Stay clean and keep the latrines in safe distance from houses. Tactical rules, on the other hand, concerned the following issues: 1. When the enemy goes forward, we withdraw; 2. When the enemy stops and organizes a camp, we bother him; 3. When the enemy wants to avoid fighting, we attack; 4. When the enemy withdraws, we chase him (Braun, 1976, p. 101). Partisan struggle in mountain regions was conducted basing on the main thesis, i.e.: "The rule of maintaining own forces and destroying enemy forces establishes the basis of war craft" (Mao Zedong, 1956, pp. 112–113). Sunzi's concepts to much extend defined the conditions of Chinese Communist Party functioning also after 1949. These guidelines became also, by Confucians rules, the basic indicator of political view of the contemporary China.

Chinese communists formed a system prepared to conditions of their own country, diametrically different from the Soviet pattern. In 1930s, Moscow laid too much trust in the group of "twenty-eight Bolsheviks," Chinese communist activists educated in the Soviet Union. This group functioned, however, without touch to what was going on in China. It consisted more of theoreticians than practitioners, proposing implementation of solutions having not too much to do with the situation. Unlike them, the "domestic" communists had been formed in the country and provided concrete solutions. Moreover, they were able to interpret correctly social moods and diagnose the current situation. After finishing the Long March in mid-1930s, the Chinese Communist Party made significant shifts within the applied methods of performance. That was the time when the USSR and Komintern finally lost their possibility of forming communism in China. Protégés of Moscow found themselves in defensive. The Komintern liaison officer by the Chinese Communist Party in Yan'an, Piotr Władimirow (1977), clearly recognized the sources of Mao's supremacy over the group of "twenty-eight Bolsheviks:" "The source of Mao's force is not only that he does not hesitate to use any hooks in this struggle, but also in very good knowledge of psychics of Chinese peasants and little bourgeois, national traditions, what cannot be said about members of 'Moscow group,' who are purely theoreticians, although truly devoted to revolution. Mao's demagoguery concerns national features and, thus, it is so flexible, well-masked and much more enhancing. Mao uses national feelings, being under foreign oppression, simultaneously taking advantage of Marxism – Leninism popularity in his speculations" (Władimirow, 1977, pp. 142–143). Chinese communists used wording characteristic for Marxists and Leninists ideology in a very instrumental way. Chinese communist party links with international communist movement were relatively weak. Communism was given mostly national character. Hence, it often recalled to what was common, i.e. own experiences grounded mostly while struggling with foreign influences. That was the basic difference between the USSR and China. Referrings to many sources were made. The society gathered around ideas filled with different sense. It was not possible to cut off the entire past. What unified various communist activists were common ex-

periences. Ross Terrill wrote that “Mao was deriving Marxism of its European origin, providing it with Chinese birth certificate” (Terrill, 2001, p. 230). Mao Zedong draw attention to the role of experience, locating it in the centre of cognizance. Hence, the cognizance took the place of object that was to be cognized: “What is necessary for direct cognizance of any phenomenon or phenomena, is the personal participation in struggle tending to change the reality, any phenomenon or phenomena, as because only such participation can lead to meeting the external side of any phenomenon or phenomena and only such practical participation lets us find and understand the essence of any phenomenon or phenomena” (Mao Zedong, 1953, p. 403). Further on, he wrote: “If you want to cognize the taste of a pear, you need to change it – take it up and beat. If you want to cognize the construction and features of an atom, you have to carry out proper physical and chemical experiments, change the condition of the atom. If you want to know the theories and methods of revolution, you need to participate in revolution. The entire real knowledge derives from actual experience” (Mao Zedong, 1953, pp. 403–404). Mao underlined the link between cognizance and practice by recalling an old Chinese proverb: “You cannot catch tiger kitties without entering tiger’s lair” (Mao Zedong, 1953, p. 404).

A good proof for instrumental usage of links with international communist movement was the position of Mao Zedong himself. On the 6th Plenum of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in 1938, he claimed: “Marxism should be given national form before it becomes applied. There is no such concept like abstractive Marxism, the is only concrete one. What we call concrete Marxism, is a Marxism that was given a national form... ‘Sinization’ of Marxism, as it shall be called, means that in all its expression, it [Marxism] derives from Chinese specific, is applied together with these characteristic features, becomes a problem that the entire party shall understand and solve immediately” (Rumiancev, 1974, pp. 34–35). This thesis was often recalled by him further on. During the Chinese Communist Party Political Bureau seating in 1943, he maintained his position, by arguing that Marxism-Leninism is needed by China, but it shall be adjusted to national, purely Chinese needs and conditions. Particularly important here were the words that “there is a need for constant and consistent struggle for truly national and independent character of the Chinese Communist Party” (Władimirow, 1977, pp. 146–147).

For communism in China, the spiritual commonwealth of the citizens of the country turned out to be more important than Marxist ideology. The quintessence of this idea was the sentence of Mao himself, spoken during the last meeting with Piotr Władimirow: “what is needed to rule China is not the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. What is most important is the knowledge of China, its needs, traditions...” (Władimirow, 1977, p. 272).

After establishing the People’s Republic of China, some efforts were made to ground the new quality. Part of this idea was implementing a ban against organizing tributes to Confucius. Situation of other cultural or religious traditions looked similarly (Zwoliński, 2007). In the hottest period of “cultural revolution,” common campaigns organized to destroy the “four olds” (regarding culture, ideas, traditions, behaviors) brought some kind of breakdown. This can be compared to what was happening in the time of Qin dynasty rulings, when books of political essences and chronics were burnt,

while, simultaneously, books concerning “healing, medicines, telling fortunes from turtle shell and from yarrow, as well as sowing plants and growing trees” survived (Sy-ma Ts’ien, 2000, p. 61). The will of building a new system made the emperor destroy everything except the Qin empire writings. Any recalls to the past, oppositions against the contemporary times, were subjected to capital punishment together with the entire family (Sy-ma Ts’ien, 2000). Mao, like the ancient emperor, tended to implement and ground the cult of his own person. In the Qin Shihuangdi times, actions were taken to unify the thinking by implementing proper “severe house morality” (Garnet, 1973). The model of acting in Mao’s times seems to be almost a copy of that pattern. It is also worth to remind the propaganda campaign against Confucius, initiated in 1970s and tending most of all to defeat political enemies of the leader and reconstruct Mao’s position, weakened by previous events. It can be said that tending to create a new model of a human being, grown and formed by socialism, did not reach its final goal. In the time of “cultural revolution,” a total break with the past did not take place. Things that happened after Mao’s death in 1976 are a proof of that. Already at the beginning of 1980s, one could have easily observe the first symptoms of regeneration of ancient ideas, kind of renaissance of Confucius thinking. That derives to much extent from the fact that, in author’s opinion, Maoism itself included many more purely Chinese elements than patterns characteristic for Marxism-Leninism. In Chinese conditions, one could have observed the birth of Confucianism in a communist version.

When Deng Xiaoping and his collaborators initiated the policy of reforms and “opening towards the world,” China entered a new stage of its history. Within the last three decades, main guidelines have been worked out, indicating the bases of Chinese political system. Representatives of the ruling class assumed building their own model of democracy. An American politologist of Polish origin, Zbigniew Brzeziński (1990), drew attention to the fact that “unlike the case of organic rejection in Eastern Europe, communism in China stands before perspective of being constantly included among the values and traditions of this country” (Brzeziński, 1990, p. 157). Such idea is supported by changes that took place in the recent years. Retiring of politicians from the first and second generation and replacing them by younger ones lead to significant quality change.³ Starting from 1982, cadres of old revolutionists were gradually replaced by a group of well-educated technocrats, mostly engineers.

Initiation of the process of reforms lead to forming various conceptions concerning state development. In Hong Yung Lee’s (1991) opinion, in 1980s, four groups were formed within the frames of the party. The first one was identified with Hu Yaobang, for whom political changes were to become the first step towards further economical reforms. Hu himself rejected the Marxist-Leninist system as not compatible with Chinese circumstances. Simultaneously, he called upon implementing democratic rules inside the party. The second group, connected with Zhao Ziyang, presented a similar scheme of thinking, supporting continuation of economical reforms. In the third group,

³ The first generation in the Chinese Communist Party were party activists who joined it before the beginning of the Long March (1934–1935). The second generation consisted of Anti-Japanese war veterans. The third generation covered politicians born in 1920s and 1930s. The youngest generations of politicians, the so called forth generation, are party members born in 1940s and later on.

there were party activists closely connected with Deng Xiaoping. It should be noted that, on one hand, this group presented quite pragmatic approach to economic issues, but, on the other, was characterized by tough position in political questions. A consistent group of conservative activists gathered around Chen Yun. They negated Maoist methods of population mobilization for economic development, but simultaneously they propagated maintaining at least the basic structure of national planning (Hong Yung Lee, 1991). Despite taking up reforms in economic area, not very much changed in political matters. At the end of March 1979, Four Basic Rules were proclaimed, indicating that China should follow socialist path, obey the proletariat rulings, party leadership and Marxism-Leninism. These writings clearly indicated that despite liberalization in many areas, the issue of leadership is not a subject for discusses. This is the Chinese Communist Party that shall remain the only force in the state.

By this occasion, a strong connection with the previous period was underlined. A proof for that was the position of the party towards the late leader Mao Zedong, expressed by 6th Plenum of 11th cadency of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in the *Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China* of June 27th 1981. Contesting Mao's achievements might have meant hitting the very bases of the system, as he was the symbol of both the revolution and national heritage. Leader's achievements in revolution struggle in the first years after creating the People's Republic of China were underlined. Nonetheless, his performance in the Great Leap Forward and "cultural revolution" periods were assessed negatively" (*Beijing Review*, no. 27, July 6, 1981). An important element of referring to the past was the issue connected with rehabilitation of victims of the past period. The campaign, lasting for few years, covered few dozens million of people. Many outstanding leaders of the party were rehabilitated posthumously. Building of a new system, considering the newly appearing challenges, was started up without breaking links with the past. The main area on which public should focus became the economic development. At the end of 1970s, the conception of Four Modernizations was assumed, covering the most important economical spheres of the country, i.e. agriculture, industry, national defense, science and technology. It is worth mentioning that ideological or political reforms were not mentioned there. The growing democratic movement in China met total disaster, finalized tragically on Tiananmen place on June 4, 1989.

The communist party had to pass through redefinition in the area of applied methods, searching for new bases of authority legitimization. For that reason, the rule of posts' division was implemented. An important move was the policy of gradual rejuvenating party cadres. Campaign for education of new cadres was started. Data, provided by "Renmin Ribao" in March 1985 indicated that only 4% of the current 42-million-members-big Chinese Communist Party possessed high education, 13.8% were graduates of secondary schools, 42.2% of preliminary schools, while 10.1% were analphabets (Ladany, 1988). Slowly, the party was supplied by a group of young people.⁴

⁴ After the 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, *People Daily* published data concerning the age structure at the end of 1981. The party gathered 39 million of members. 6.8% of them joined the party

Transformation in China was to be managed by the ruling party. In his elaboration in October 1987, the General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (1988) defined the guidelines of what is commonly known as socialism with Chinese specific: “Socialism of characteristic Chinese features means joining of universal rules of Marxism with the issue of modernization of China” (Zhao Ziyang, 1988, p. 54). Zhao speeches, indicating various differences of Chinese reality, made a visible deflection from classical Marxism: “Building socialism in such great state of the East as China, is a *novum* in the history of Marxism development. Situation which we face is not equal to what was assumed by creators of Marxism, i.e. building socialism basing on highly developed capitalism, but also differs from the one met by other socialist states. One can neither mechanically implement book formulas nor copy foreign experience. Necessarily, one has to consider the actual conditions of our state as the starting point, join universal regularities of Marxism with Chinese reality, and, in practice activity, promote the way of building socialism of Chinese characteristic features. In this area, our party possesses important considerations and valuable achievements. Simultaneously, it has passed through many failures for which it had to pay a high price” (Zhao Ziyang, 1988, p. 10). The priorities became economic development, struggling with poverty, industrialization and modernization of the state as well as technological progress. The communist party was to play the role of system’s securer. The confirmation of the newly chosen way was implementation, by the General Chinese Congress of Peoples’ Representatives in March 1993, an amendment, changing the wording of art. 15 of the constitution of 1982. Then, the term of “socialistic market economy” appeared, replacing the old definition of planned economy. Simultaneously, statements concerning national enterprises obliged to meet requirements defined by the plan, were cancelled (Wang, 2002). Within the conditions of Chinese state, adopting rules characteristic for market economies took place. But what is typical, is filling the term with the word “socialistic,” tending to indicate clearly the vision of forming the economic development. To this vision one should also add strong recalling to elements of Confucius tradition. Individuals co-operating with each other become the force pushing forward the national economy. It is worth mentioning that in China since the end of 1970s, one can observe changes in the area of social behaviors. Lu Le drew attention to four significant elements that appeared together with changes in socio-economic zone, i.e. transferring from ethic economics into economical ethics; replacing *renzhi*, i.e. administrating by personal authority; popularization of rules typical for sciences in various kinds of economic activities; adopting Confucian’s guidelines to rules of market economy (Lu Le, 2003).

In September 1997, the 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Beijing, approved building socialism with Chinese specific in the area of conducted economical changes and actions connected with privatization of national companies. An important resolution of this congress was acceptance to various kinds of ownership in the economy. On that time, the president of the state, Jiang Zemin, started promoting the idea of “spiritual civilization,” that was to stand against moral and ethical decline and social chaos that might have appeared in the period of economic transformation.

before 1949, 38.6% between 1949 and 1966, 40.6% in the years 1966–1976, the rest 14% after the end of “cultural revolution”, in the years 1976–1981 (Ladany, 1988).

For that purpose, Jiang suggested taking up actions tending to educate patriotism, commonwealth, socialism and dynamic “social morality, work ethics and family virtues” (Wang, 2002, pp. 57–58).

It can be noted that the strategy of performance of the communist party significantly evolves. Searching for new sources of legitimization of its authority, it visibly looks for instruments providing the sureness of success. On the other hand, focusing the society on common endeavors and targets leads to strengthening the state. In this context, important efforts were made by the 16th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2002. That was the time when the government authorities informed that their goal becomes building a national model of democracy that would consider local realities and specific. Hence, the idea of reflecting Western solutions was rejected. What turned out to be important from the point of view of building social integrity, was the opening towards private entrepreneurs. That fact was reflected in the accepted conception of “Three Representations,” lanced since late 1990s by president Jiang Zemin (*People Daily*, November 18, 2002). This statement constituted a significant deflection from the hitherto ideology, underlining the supremacy of workers-peasants’ alliance. Such vision was not changed by Jiang’s words, underlining that workers, peasants and soldiers still established the “backbone of the party” (*People Daily*, November 18, 2002). Position of private entrepreneurs within the party was significantly strengthened as a result of implementing proper statements in party’s status and in the constitution. In March 2004, the General Chinese Congress of Peoples’ Representatives approved the amendments to the constitution, concerning protection over private ownership and respect to human rights.

Economic development remains the main area on which the public is focused. Economic indicators show that China becomes one of the biggest players on the global scene. In the period since 1978, i.e. the moment of starting up reforms managed by Deng Xiaoping, up till 2006, the Chinese economy noted average yearly growth of ca. 9.6%. In the same period, the gross national product grew up from USD 216.5 billion up to USD 2.6 trillion (*China Daily*, November 6, 2007). Moreover, it is worth mentioning that in the recent years, China notes big surpluses in foreign trade. The surplus for 2006 made USD 177.47 billion, meaning a 74% increase in comparison to the previous year, when the surplus made USD 102 billion (*Puls Biznesu*, January 10, 2007). These indicators show clearly that within the coming decades, China are to join the group of the biggest economic powers of the world. It can be said that internal conditionings will make a positive influence on development policy. Nonetheless, it should be stated that in the meanwhile, various problems connected with this process will appear. Good examples can be the growing differences in development of various regions of the country, citizens incomes, lack of qualified employees with simultaneous growth of low-qualified labor, growing unemployment, problems connected with natural environment protection, issues connected with health care, etc. There are many more such crucial areas and, thus, one has to keep them in mind when considering development perspectives of China.

The communist party, being the only meaning political force in the state, faces big challenges. It is worth mentioning that the moves of the recent years tended to ground its position among the public. Only one Chinaman per twenty is a member of this or-

ganization. At the end of 2006, the Chinese Communist Party gathered 72.391 millions of members (*People Daily*, July 11, 2007). But what is worth mentioning, is the significant opening towards new societies, previously not considered in party's policy. Besides the mentioned business environment, a big success of the authorities was enhancing young people and women.⁵ The party evolves and the ideology is significantly pushed into the background. Well-educated technocrats, considering market assumptions, get the voice. That fact became already fully visible during the 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1997. Then, the entire permanent committee of the Central Committee consisted of technocrats. Moreover, among 24 members of the Political Bureau, 18 can be defined in such way. Since that moment, this new leader team started to call itself a "nubile technocratic leadership" (Wong, Yongnian Zheng, 2002, p. 92). The last decade shows that the authorities transfer their centre of interest; new authorities do not use the old rhetoric. No one discusses the struggle of classes. The truth challenge becomes grounding the position, maintaining the existing system, reinforcing its elements. A continuously evolving mechanism is observed. It can be easily seen that the local authorities still search for legitimization of their position. A proof for this might be the speech of president Hu Jintao on August 31, 2007, underlining the necessity of developing education all over the country. In his opinion, this is the area that should become the leading one to educate more specialists and build properly functioning society as well as support the further modernization of the state (*People Daily*, August 31, 2007). The official idea promoted by Hu became "building a harmonic society." Together with growing potential of the state, the standard of living of its citizens keeps growing as well (*China Daily*, September 29, 2007).

In China, we can observe building a system adjusted to the local conditionings; some elements coming from the West are transformed accordingly to the local culture and tradition. This should also be the way of considering possibility of adopting democracy in the Western mode onto Chinese ground. Democracy – in the opinion of Chinese prime minister, Wen Jiabao – "is a value pursued by all mankind and a fruit of civilization created by mankind. However, in different historical stages and different countries, democracy is achieved through different forms and in different ways" (*The Times*, September 6, 2006). Development of citizens' society is carried out under control of the communist party. In China, monopole of government is observed. Any expressions of activity contrasting with the accepted political line of the party are subjected to severe punishments. A good example might have been the activity of Falungong sect, gathering more members in 1990s than the communist party. From the point of view of the authorities, each such behavior became the source of anxiety and implementing social chaos. It can be said that fear of chaos or disturbing social balance always defined the behavior of rulers of the State of the Middle in crises situations. Chinamen, living for ages in constant contact with foreigners, adopted many concepts taken from outside. But it has to be remembered that they grounded them in their local way. A kind of source can become Taiwan. Reunification of the island with the conti-

⁵ At the end of 2006, the Chinese Communist Party gathered 16.919 million people below 35 (0.4% increase in comparison to the previous year). On the other hand, number of women in the analogical period grew up at 0.5%, making 14.292 million (19.7% of the entire cadres) (*People Daily*, July 11, 2007).

nent can become a significant impulse on the way to political changes in China. Anyway, there is no doubt that democracy in Chinese version would not be a copy of patterns well-known in western states. What can be rather observed in China is adapting the term which is then filled by different essence. Strong connection to Chinese or Asian values results in forming system of ruling in the State of the Middle presenting more domestic than foreign features. Tending to understand this, one should search in ancient history, giving answers to most of the questions about the form and future of the rulings in China.

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